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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND
GOVERNMENT RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS: THE
COURT THAT STOLE CHRISTMAS
NTRODUCTION
Each year, around early November, America begins to see
displays of the following images strewn across the country's
landscape: candy striped poles dispersed among reindeer and
snowmen; Christmas trees adorned with festive ornaments; nativity
scenes and depictions of Santa Claus on his sleigh; and lighted
menorahs. In fact, such displays are so much a part of our culture
that they are expected to appear annually in the late autumn season.
For example, consider an annual display that is located in the front
courtyard of a County Hall of Records building in my home state
of New Jersey. The scene consists of a rendition of the Christian
nativity, representing the birth of Jesus in a manger in Bethlehem.'
On the opposite side of the courtyard is a menorah, a symbol
widely identified with the Jewish religion. The lighting of the
menorah has been recognized as the primary ritual for the Jewish
people at Hanukah.2 Such common winter scenes have ignited
controversy and chaos in the law involving the constitutionality of
government displays of religious symbols.
3
The annual appearances of winter scenes that contain religious
symbols are a part of the American tradition. However, when the
government sponsors holiday displays, it may be violative of First
Amendment principles. The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment prohibits Congress from making a law "respecting an
establishment of religion." Yet, when the issue involves the
'ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1438 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating further that
the event has "particular significance to the Christian religion, which worships
Jesus as the Son of God and the messiah."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2434 (1997).
2 Id. The menorah is "a nine branched candelabrum used by the Jews to
commemorate the Miracle of the Oils, a seminal event in Jewish History that
took place during the rededication of the Temple of Jerusalem." Id. See
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
3 See infra notes 27-150 and accompanying text.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." Id.
1053
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determination of whether a specific government-backed religious
display violates the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court has
left a hodgepodge of rules that offer little assistance. Analyzing
the legality of these displays has proven to be a painstaking task.5
It may seem surprising that reindeers, Christmas trees, and
menorahs can be the source of so much conflict. This article
illustrates and analyzes continuing problems associated with
jurisprudence involving government-backed religious displays.
Part I will discuss the five landmark United States Supreme Court
decisions that have left inconsistent guidelines with which lower
courts and communities struggle when determining the
constitutionality of public displays of religious holiday symbols.
6
Part II will comment on two lower court decisions that illustrate
how these inconsistent opinions from the Supreme Court are dealt
with by the lower courts Part III will explore what commentators
deem as probable reasons for the disturbing state of the law
pertaining to government-backed holiday displays.8 Finally, Part
IV suggests an analysis that would better suit jurisprudence
involving public holiday displays.9
I. FIVE SEMINAL SUPREME COURT CASES
The five modem seminal United States Supreme Court cases
most referred to for guidance by courts when determining the
constitutionality of public holiday displays are: Everson v. Board
of Education,10 Lemon v. Kurtzman," Lynch v. Donnelly,2
Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union (A CL U), 13 and
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette.14 These five
' See infra notes 27-150 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 10-85 and accompanying text..
'See infra notes 86-150 and accompanying text.
8 See infra 151-27 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 228-282 and accompanying text.
10 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
" 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
1 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
13492 U.S. 573 (1989).
14 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
(Vol 151054
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cases provide intriguing insights as to why there exists tremendous
controversy when analyzing the constitutionality of these displays.
A. Everson v. Board of Education
Everson v. Board of Education,5 decided in 1947, was the
Court's first modem discussion and interpretation of the
Establishment Clause. 16 The Everson court proclaimed that both
the federal government and state governments are prohibited from
setting up a church. 7 Moreover, they may not pass laws aimed at
aiding religion. Everson's most important assertion was that the
First Amendment erected a "high and impregnable wall" between
Church and State." However, the height of this "wall" remains
problematic for the legal community.' 9 The Everson opinion is
also significant for the Court's application of the Establishment
Clause to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.20
15330 U.S. 1.
16 Kyle D. Freeman, Robinson v. City of Edmond, 32 TULSA L.J. 605, 605
(1997). The Everson court determined the constitutionality of a New Jersey
statute that authorized local school districts to enter into contracts which
provided for the transportation of children between their schools and homes.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. Pursuant to the New Jersey statute, a township school
board ("Board") allowed cost reimbursement to parents who incurred expenses
by paying for their children's transportation to school. Id. A portion of these
funds was utilized for the payment of some children's transportation to parochial
schools. Id. The Appellant claimed that the Board's reimbursement for
transportation to parochial schools violated the First Amendment. Id. at 18.
Despite the Court's strong contention that a lofty bulwark between church and
state must be maintained, the Court found that the statute passed constitutional
muster. Id. The Court specifically asserted that New Jersey did not contribute
funds directly to the parochial schools. Id. Justice Jackson, in his dissent,
opined that the majority's conclusion was inconsistent with its "high and
impregnable wall" proclamation. Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
17Id. at 15.
18 Id.
'
9 See infra notes 27-227 and accompanying text.
o Everson, 330 U.S. at 8. The Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution states in pertinent part: "No person shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of Law..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§1.
1999 1055
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B. Lemon v. Kurtzman
Although the Everson Court announced that the Establishment
Clause erected a lofty wall between Church and State,2' it was not
until 1971, when the Supreme Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 z
that the Court attempted to provide explicit guidelines pertaining to
the Establishment Clause.3 This decision is noted for the creation
of what is called the "Lemon test., 24 Most courts use the well-
known tripartite test that was developed by the Lemon court in
determining whether a specific government action is in violation of
the Establishment Clause. The test's three requirements are as
follows: "(1) the government activity must have a secular purpose;
(2) the activity must have a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the activity must not involve
excessive entanglement of government with religion."' These
criteria, nonetheless, have failed to produce predictable results,
especially in the realm of government displays of religious
symbols.
26
C. Lynch v. Donnelly
The Supreme Court first applied the Lemon test to a government
display of religious symbols in its 1984 decision in Lynch v.
21 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22 403 U.S. 602.
2 Freeman, supra note 16, at 621.24 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
25 Id. at 612-13. The Lemon court used its new test to decide the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. Id. at
606. The provisions authorized salary supplements to church-related elementary
and secondary schools. Id. Pennsylvania's program entitled financial
reimbursement for the cost of salaries of teachers, books, and other teaching
material used in secular subjects. Id. at 606-07. The Rhode Island statute
allowed for a fifteen-percent salary supplement to be paid directly to non-public
elementary school teachers. Id. at 607. The Court found both statutes
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause for failing the third prong of the
test, excessive entanglement. Id.
2 See infra notes 27-227 and accompanying text.
1056 [Vol 15
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Donnelly.2 ' The display at issue in Lynch was exhibited annually
by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island ("City") in a privately
owned park located in the center of a shopping district.' The scene
consisted of Santa's house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, carolers,
clowns, elephants, a colossal number of colored lights, a large
banner containing the words "SEASONS GREETINGS," a
Christmas tree, and a creche.2 The Lynch court noted that the
display resembled those found in hundreds of government sites
across the country during the Christmas season.3"
City residents and members of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) challenged the constitutionality of the City's
inclusion of the creche in the display' In determining whether the
display was constitutional under the Establishment Clause, the
Court stressed that when dealing with Establishment Clause issues
there must be a balancing between the need to prohibit unnecessary
inf'ingement of either Church or State upon the other, and the
realization that total distance between Church and State is
unrealistic.3 2 One can see the Court's uncertainty as to the height
of the wall between Church and State.
The Court proceeded to cite events in American history and
cultural instances, such as President Washington's proclamation of
Thanksgiving Day as a public holiday, in support of a more lenient
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.3 In addition, the Court
27465 U.S. 668 (1984). In Lynch, the Court analyzed a holiday display in light
of each prong of the Lemon test in ruling the scene was constitutional. Id. at
680-85. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. This decision is also known
for Justice O'Connor's concurrence which deals primarily with the second prong
of the Lemon test. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
s Id. at 671. The City erected the display in conjunction with the downtown
retail merchant's association. Id. Expenditures by the City for the creche's
maintenance included $1,365.00 for its purchase, S20.00 per year for its erection
and dismantling, and minor expenses for the creche's lighting. Id.
' Id. The creche consisted of the "the traditional figures, including the Infant
Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals." Id.
30 [d.
31 Id. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
32 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672.
11 Id. at 675 (stating that Thanksgiving has retained its theme of expressing
thanks for Divine aid just as Christmas has retained its religious significance).
The Court also referred to the first week of the First Session of the First
1999 1057
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cited to Stone v. Graham34 and Abington School District v.
Schempp35 and concluded that it was necessary to look at the
creche "in the context of the Christmas season."'36 Accordingly,
the Court looked at the first prong of the Lemon test and decided
there was a secular purpose behind the City's display of the
creche.37 The Court found the creche was erected for the secular
purpose of celebrating Christmas and illustrating the origins of the
holiday. 3 As for the second prong of the Lemon test, the Court
held that the City's inclusion of the creche in the exhibit-did not
give rise to the appearance that the City endorsed Christianity."
Finally, the Court concluded that the City's display was not
offensive to the test's third prong; the display did not foster
excessive entanglement by the government with religion.4"
Congress in 1789. Id. at 674 (noting specifically that during the week that
Congress approved the Establishment Clause as part of the Bill of Rights it
passed legislation allowing for paid chaplains in the House and Senate). The
Court additionally referred to the national motto "In God We Trust." Id. at 676
(citing 36 U.S.C. § 186). The Court also referred to government subsidized art
galleries exhibiting religious displays and the City's display. Id. at 677 (noting
the National Gallery in Washington displays works carrying primarily Christian
connotations, such as the Last Supper and the Crucifixion).
' 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding the posting of the Ten Commandments on
public classroom walls as Establishment Clause violations because the posting
had no secular purpose, whereas "the Bible may constitutionally be used in an
appropriate study of history.").
3' 347 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding a requirement of daily Bible readings as
unconstitutional, but noting that such study "when presented objectively as part
of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the first
amendment").
36 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
37 Id. at 681.
38 Id. The Court asserted that even though there may be religious undertones to
a display, as long as some secular purpose behind the display exists there is no
Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 680.
39 Id. at 682 (stating "We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving
from inclusion of the creche than from benefits and endorsement previously held
not violative of the Establishment Clause."). The Lynch court did concede that
the display had the effect of advancing religion to an extent; however, the Court
justified its holding and claimed that precedent case law anticipated the
occasional advancement of religion from government action. Id. at 683.
40 Id. at 684. "There is nothing here, of course, like the 'comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance' or the 'enduring
1058 [Vol 15
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In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
majority on the constitutionality of the display." However, Justice
O'Connor proposed a modification of the Lenon test, now known
as the "endorsement test."42 In essence, Justice O'Connor framed
the issues as whether the government intends to disseminate a
message endorsing or disapproving of religion and whether the
government action has the effect of sending a message of
endorsement or disapproval. 3
When applying the "endorsement test" to the display in Lynch,
Justice O'Connor recognized that holiday displays have historical
significance; therefore, they are not understood to represent
government endorsement of religion."M In other words, Justice
O'Connor believes the historical context of the display must be
analyzed in detail to decide its constitutionality effectively under
the Establishment Clause.45 Justice O'Connor's endorsement
analysis appeared again in later decisions involving religious
displays. In fact, the .Court in Allegheny County v. ACLU
incorporated the endorsement test into its analysis.46
D. Allegheny County v. ACLU
The next major Supreme Court decision involving the
constitutionality of a government-backed religious display was
Allegheny County v. ACLU.47  Allegheny County like Lynch,
exemplifies the Court's departure from a strict application of the
entanglement' present in Lemon." (citations omitted). Specifically, the Court
noted there was no contact with church authorities concerning the exhibit and no
lofty expenses for maintenance. Id.
41Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor proclaimed that
"Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message." Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
4 See infra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
47 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
1999 1059
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tripartite Lemon test, specifically when dealing with government-
backed displays of religious symbols.
4
At issue in Allegheny County were two holiday displays situated
on public property in the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and
owned by the County of Allegheny ("County"). 49 The first display
consisted of a creche located on the Grand Staircase of the County
Courthouse.5  In contrast to the Lynch scene, no other figures,
such as Santa Claus and reindeer, were included in the holiday
exhibit.5
Following Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis, the Court
looked at whether the display in its setting had the effect of
"endorsing or disproving religious beliefs."' Consequently, the
Court held that the creche exhibit was offensive to the
Establishment Clause.53 The Court opined that the context of the
creche sent a message of governmental endorsement.m
4' In fact, Justice Blackmun, the author of the majority opinion in Allegheny
County proclaimed the decision as a departure from Lemon and a move toward a
"refined definition of governmental action that unconstitutionally advances
religion." Id. at 592.
'9 Id. at 578. Recall that the display at issue in Lynch was located in a privately
owned park. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
o Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 580. In addition, the County placed a fence
around the creche with a plaque attached that proclaimed: "This Display is
Donated by the Holy Name Society." Id. Some greenery, such as poinsettias
circled the fence. Id. Furthermore, an angel occupied the display's pinnacle.
Id.
s' Id. at 580-81; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
52Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 597.
53Id. at 621 (stating the creche display has "an unconstitutional effect."),
Id. The Allegheny County court saw the creche display as different from the
scene in Lynch; the creche stood alone on the Hall's Grand Staircase,
unaccompanied by objects that diluted the scene's religious elements. Id. at
598. The Court stated that "unlike in Lynch, nothing in the context of the
display detracts from the creche's religious message." Id. According to Justice
Blackmun, the flowers that surrounded the creche added to the appearance of the
government's endorsement of Christianity, whereas the figures in the Lynch
scene detracted from the appearance of religious endorsement. Id. at 621
(stating the "floral decoration surrounding the creche cannot be viewed as
somehow equivalent to the secular symbols in the overall Lynch display.").
Furthermore, the Court found it noteworthy that the creche was located on the
Grand Staircase, one of the most prominent locations in the County. Id.
[Vol 151060
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The Court arrived at a contrary conclusion as to the
constitutionality of the second display. The second display located
outside the City-County Building consisted of a menorah adjacent
to a Christmas tree.'5 The large size of the Christmas tree adjacent
to the menorah and the widely accepted view of the Christmas tree
as a secular symbol, conveyed a secular message that recognized
Christmas and Hanukah traditions as contemporaneous alternative
customs 6
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed
that the County's manifestation of the menorah was constitutional,
further disagreeing that the creche display was an Establishment
Clause violation. 7 Justice Kennedy sharply criticized the Court's
use of the endorsement test and proposed what is known as the
"coercion test."5' 8 Justice Kennedy expressed that applying an
endorsement analysis to holiday displays exudes an unfounded
belligerence towards religion 9 According to Kennedy, the
government cannot coerce one to believe in or exercise any
religion and the government cannot directly benefit any religion in
a manner that would establish a State Church6
Kennedy applied the coercion test to the two displays at issue and
concluded that in allowing the displays on government premises
the County simply recognized the celebratory nature of the season;
" Id. at 578. The scene also contained a sign saluting liberty. Id. The Court
framed the issue as whether the display sent a message of endorsement of
Christianity and Judaism, or whether the display appeared secular in nature as a
celebration of the winter holiday season. Id. at 616.
5 1 Id. at 620.
1 Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 1 Id. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59 Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Kennedy gave an example of a coercive government act under the Establishment
Clause - a city permitting a large Latin Cross on the roof of a government hall.
Id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He contrasted
this to "passive and symbolic" acts of governmental religious accommodation
that gives merely and incidental benefit to religion, such as the display in Lynch.
Id. at 662 (Kennedy, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra note
39 and accompanying text.
1999 1061
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the County did not use governmental authority to proselytize. 1
The Justice described the creche and menorah as "passive
symbols" that a viewer can disagree with.62 Furthermore, he stated
that whether a creche be adjacent to poinsettias and wishing wells
is irrelevant; rather, the seasonal context is what makes the creche
lawful under the Establishment Clause.63 The next section will
illustrate a decision in which the Court used the context of a
display to formulate a per se rule for government sponsored
religious exhibits.'
E. Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette
In the 1995 decision of Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette, 6
the Supreme Court determined whether a state offends the
Establishment Clause when, under a religiously neutral state
policy, a state authorizes a private party to erect an unaccompanied
religious symbol in a public plaza.' The park at issue in Capitol
Square was owned by the state of Ohio ("State") and encompassed
the government's Statehouse.67 As a "traditional public forum,"
the park was used regularly for a variety of public events, such as
speeches and festivals.6 8 The Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board ("Board") had the responsibility of'regulating public access
to the park.69 Litigation arose from the Board's denial of the Klu
61Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).6 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Lynch, 465
U.S. 668).
63 Id. at 668. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Lynch, 465 U.S. 668).
6' See infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
65 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
6Id. at 757.
67 Id.
6 id.
69 Id. The Board's regular conduct had been to allow a wide range of diverse
people to sponsor events in the plaza. Id. at 758. In addition, the Board had
allowed unattended exhibits to be erected in the park, such as a lighted
Christmas tree sponsored by the State and a privately owned menorah. Id.
1062 [Vol 15
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Klux Klan's ("KKK") application to place a cross in the plaza
from December 8, 1993 to December 24, 1993.70
In its review of the Sixth Circuit's decision that the exhibit of the
Cross did not violate the Establishment Clause, the Court
recognized that the symbolic display was a form of private
expression and the park had a long-standing tradition of sponsoring
a broad variety of expression.71 Nevertheless, the Court noted that
a state's need to abide by the Establishment Clause is sufficient to
justify "the imposition of content-based regulations" on speech.
The Court determined the issue of whether the government's
interest in adhering to the Establishment Clause was implied in the
instance of the cross display. The Court concluded that the plaza
was a traditional public gathering place; therefore, any benefit to
religion arising from an activity in the plaza was merely
incidental.7
3
Contrary to the Board's argument that an endorsement test
should be used here, the Court established that a privately
sponsored display in a public forum is constitutional per se.7'
Viewers of the cross were aware that the park had a history of
70id.
7 Id. at 759; see also Knights of the Klu Klux Klan v. Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Board, 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994).
' Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 757.
73 Id. at 759, 762. In its analysis, the Court cited to Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School Dist. Id. at 761-62. See also Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1983). Lamb's Chapel
involved a school district's authorization of private groups to use school-
premises during after-school hours. Id. at 386. The school district did not allow
the school facilities to be used for religious purposes. Id. at 387. Accordingly,
suit was brought against the school district when a church was forbidden to use
the facilities to show a series of films. Id. at 388. The Court held that the film
series was not an Establishment Clause violation under the Lemon test. Id. at
395. In applying the Lamb's Chapel holding to the KKK's Cross, the Court in
Capitol Square held that since the plaza is traditionally a public gathering place
like the school in Lamb's Chapel, any benefit to religion arising from an activity
in the plaza is merely incidental and not a constitutional violation. Capitol
Square, 515 U.S. at 762. "The Lamb's Chapel reasoning applies fortiori here,
where the property at issue is not a school, but a full-fledged public forum." ld.
' Id. at 770 (stating that religious expression cannot be violative of the
Establishment Clause "where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a
traditional or designated public forum.").
1999 1063
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being a neutral public forum for the diverse expression of private
groups. Therefore, it was not necessary to subject the exhibit to an
endorsement analysis. In sum, the Capitol Square court held that
the erection of the KKK cross in a public plaza was not an
Establishment Clause violation.75
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion disagreed that a privately
sponsored display in a public forum is constitutional per se.76
Justice O'Connor indicated that the endorsement test is the
appropriate analysis for private symbols in a public plaza. 7 In
addition, Justice O'Connor described the "reasonable person" used
in an endorsement analysis. 78  She asserted that the reasonable
observer in the endorsement inquiry is one who is mindful of the
"history and context of the community and forum in which the
display appears." 79 Consequently, the Justice concluded that the
reasonable observer would not view the State's allowance of the
KKK's exhibit as religious endorsement.80
Conversely, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, defined
the reasonable observer as one who is unknowledgeable of the
75 1d.
76 Id. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
I Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor feels that an impermissible
communication of endorsement could be transmitted even where the speech
does not involve direct government involvement. Id. at 774 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). O'Connor did recognize that the private ownership of the cross,
along with the symbol's location in a public square, is valuable to Establishment
Clause scrutiny under an endorsement analysis. Id. at 775 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). She noted that such factors as ownership and location are to be
considered when deciding if the reasonable observer would see the government
action as religious endorsement. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, these
factors should only be considerations, not triggers, for a "ftxed per se rule." Id.
at 778 (O'Connor, J., concurring).78 Id. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor noted that the reasonable observer
should be deemed as possessing the knowledge that the cross is a religious sign
and the park is government owned. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). She further
stated that the reasonable observer should be deemed aware of the nature of the
park as a forum for diverse activities. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'o Id. at 782 (O'Connor, J,. concurring).
1064 [Vol 15
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history and context of the community.8' Justice Stevens' definition
extends constitutional protection to the average passerby.'
The conflicting rationales that characterize the Capitol Square
court follow the pattern of the four other previously discussed
decisions.83 These five seminal cases illustrate that the issue of the
constitutionality of public religious displays is, as one
commentator suggests, "an area of jurisprudence beset by judicial
difficulties."' In addition to these Supreme Court decisions, lower
court cases further exemplify the precarious status of the law in
this area.s5
II. TWO LOWER COURT DECISIONS
The splintered majorities, fact-sensitive inquiries, and complex
plurality opinions that characterize the Supreme Court decisions
involving the constitutionality of public religious displays are
problematic for lower courts and communities: Which displays
offend the Constitution? 6 The Second and Third Circuits are
examples of two courts that have had to decipher the potpourri of
painstaking tests and inconsistencies left by the Supreme Court.
This next section will delve into two lower court decisions relating
to government-backed religious displays - American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) v. Scundleru and Elewiski v. City of Syracuse.8
81 Id. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).83 See supra notes 15-64 and accompanying text.
' Steven B. Goodman, Constitutional Law-Public Display of Religious
Symbols And The Establishment Clause-Doe v. Small, 65 TEmP. L. REV. 259,
274 (1991).85 See infra notes 86-150 and accompanying text.
86 See infra notes 89-150 and accompanying text; see also Recent Cases,
Constitutional Law-Establishment Clause-Second Circuit Holds That Cit4s
Display Of A Creche In A Public Park Does Not Unconstitutionally Endorse
Religion-Elewiski v. City of Syracuse, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2462, 2462 (1998);
Kathryn R. Williams, Constitutional Law-Squeezing Lemon, 69 TEMIP. L. REV.
1609, 1609 (1996).
87 104 F.3d 1435, 1438 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2434 (1997).
88 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1186 (1998).
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A. ACLU v. Schundler
For many years, the city of Jersey City ("City") displayed a
creche and a menorah during the winter holiday season. 9 In 1994
Hanukah ended before the arrival of Christmas; therefore, the City
removed the menorah before the creche was erected,' ° and
displayed a decorated Christmas tree adjacent to the creche.91
Subsequently, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
transmitted a letter to the City's mayor asking the City to
reevaluate its annual tradition of erecting religious symbols on
public property. 2 Two days later, the City erected a sign next to
the display that read, "Through this display and others throughout
the year, the City of New Jersey is pleased to celebrate the diverse
cultural and ethnic heritages of its peoples." 93
Notwithstanding an injunction from the district court, which
deemed the 1994 display a constitutional violation,94 the City
erected the annual display in front of City Hall on December 13,
1995. 95 Accordingly, the ACLU applied to the district court for a
9 Schundler, 104 F.3d at 1438.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
3 Id. At the time the ACLU filed its action with the court, the display was
comprised of the creche, the evergreen tree, and the sign. Id. The United State
District Court for the District of New Jersey decided in favor of the ACLU,
based on the ACLU's claims that the City's display of the symbols violated the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution and the Religious
Preference Clause of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 1439 (citing ACLU v.
Schundler, 931 F. Supp. 1180, 1187 (D. N.J. 1995)).
9 See ACLU v. Schundler, No. 95-206 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 1995). The court
granted an injunction having the effect of permanently prohibiting the City from
displaying the creche and menorah, or any comparable display. Id.
9 Schundler, 104 F.3d at 1439. This display not only included the menorah
and the creche, but also a wooden sled, a plastic Santa Claus, and a Plastic
Frosty the Snowman. Id. Additionally, the figures that were previously inside
the manger were removed and placed on the sides of the creche. Id. Added to
the branches of the evergreen tree were Kwaanza symbols. Id. Two signs were
adjacent to the display which contained the same wording as the sign erected the
previous year. Id.
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preliminary injunction and a judgment of civil contempt, but the
requests were denied.96
On appeal, the Schundler court first looked briefly at the Everson
and Lemon opinions.97 The court referred to the Lemon test as
"maligned."98  However, the Schundler court proclaimed its
obligation to heed the test "until instructed otherwise by a majority
of the Supreme Court."99  The court then looked at Lynch,
Allegheny County, and Capitol Square to determine that the
endorsement test was the correct analysis for the City's display." °
Therefore, the court did not apply the Lemon test in its true form;
rather, the endorsement test is one of the test's modified
versions.10'
First, as to the 1994 display, the Schundler court noted that the
creche is the primary religious emblem for the Christmas
tradition. Consequently, the court determined that the
government-owned creche erected on City property violated the
endorsement test by sending a message that the City supported
Christianity.0 3 Furthermore, the court concluded that the use of
public funds to exhibit and maintain a religious scene directly
triggers the Establishment Clause. 4 Indeed, the City's display
was exhibited and maintained with public expenditures. As a
result, City taxpayers had no choice but to support the display.' 5
96 Id. The court found that the figures of Santa Claus and Frosty, along with the
sled and Kwaanza symbols, detracted from the intensity of the display, making
the scene lawful under the Establishment Clause. Id. Accordingly, the court
changed its November, 1995 order to mandate that the City erect secular holiday
symbols in addition to the creche and menorah in order to prevent its exhibit
from offending the Establishment Clause. Id. (citing ACLU v. Schundler, No.,
95-206 (D. N.J. Dec. 21, 1995)). Both the City and the ACLU filed timely
Notices of Appeal with the Third Circuit. Id. at 1439-40.
' Id. at 1440; see supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
98Id.
99 Id.
1o Id. at 1444; see supra notes 27-85 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
o2 Schundler, 104 F.3d at 1445 (citing Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 627).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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According to the Schundler court, one of the constraints of the
Establishment Clause is the prohibition of the utilization of public
funds for religious activities. 6
As for the inclusion of the menorah with the creche, the
Schundler court asserted that the menorah is also a religious
symbol and the menorah did not dilute the appearance of
government religious endorsement, nor did the City's "token"
erection of the Christmas tree.1°7 The City, nonetheless, contended
that its display was constitutional because the City celebrates a
variety of religious holidays throughout the year; so that, the year
as a whole should be the "context" against which the creche and
menorah are measured.108  According to the City, the display's
message became the recognition of diversity, not religious
endorsement. 09
The Schundler court rejected the City's diversity argument for
three different reasons.1 First, the court asserted that the law
mandates a prohibition on government endorsement of any number
of religions.' Second, a reasonable observer cannot be defined as
one who has knowledge of the cultural and religious celebrations
"o6 Id. Referring to Justice O'Connor's concurrence from Allegheny County, the
court opined that the City's use of public money to exhibit and upkeep the
display heightened the "risk of making religion relevant.. .to status in the
community." Id. at 1446 (quoting Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 627
(O'Connor, J. concurring)).
10 Id. (stating that a "menorah is a religious symbol. And when displayed
with a creche, the menorah's religious significance is emphasized. Moreover,
the token inclusion of the Christmas tree does little to mitigate the religious
message of the creche and menorah.").
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 /Id.
. Id. at 1446-47. The court opined that the City's dependence on Justice
O'Connor's Allegheny County concurrence was invalid, Id. at 1447.
Unequivocally, the court stated that the City misunderstood O'Connor's
assertions about diversity and pluralism. Id. Although O'Connor did stress that
the menorah placed next to the secular symbol of the Christmas tree gave the
appearance of a recognition of diversity, rather than religious endorsement, the
application of her reasoning to the City's display is erroneous according to the
Schundler court. Id.
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that occur in the City throughout the year."" In other words, the
court adopted Justice Stevens' view that a reasonable observer
should not be deemed aware of the display's history and context.
As a result, the court concluded that the reasonable observer of the
City's scene could not be deemed aware of the City's religious and
cultural events." 3 Finally, the court asserted that the City's use of
religious symbols to commemorate an abundance of religions
constituted excessive entanglement.11 4 In sum, the court concluded
that the City's 1994 display amounted to nothing less than an
unconstitutional endorsement of Christianity and Judaism." 5
As for the 1995 display, including the sled, Frosty, and Santa,
the court decided that the display did not pass muster under the
Establishment Clause.Y6 The court established that the Allegheny
County opinion did not set a "per se rule" that non-religious
symbols placed adjacent to religious symbols are constitutionally
permissible.1 7 Rather, the context of each display must be taken
into account. 8 Therefore, overruling the district court, the Third
112 1d In rejecting the City's argument that the "reasonable informed observer"
of the 1994 display should be taken as kmowing the City's year-round
celebrations of various religions and cultures, the Schundler court looked at the
definitions of the reasonable observer that were depicted in the Capitol Square
decision. Id. at 1448. The court disagreed with Justice O'Connor's definition of
the reasonable observer and chose to adopt the definition of Justice Stevens. Id.
n3Id at 1449.
14 Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 630 (1971)). The court noted that even if
the City could prevent the appearance of government endorsement through the
celebration of many different religions and cultures, the plan amounts to
excessive entanglement by the government with religious affairs. Id. Such a
policy, for example, would lead the City to render decisions about which
holidays to recognize, along with decisions about which symbols are sufficiently
secular to display. Id. In turn, the Schundler court indicated that these decisions
would yield political divisiveness in the community, in that religious groups that
were not recognized in a display would feel alienated. Id. at 1450.
115 Ld at 1446.
1161d at 1451.
1 1 7 Id
118 Id at 1451 (stating "the Supreme Court, in its myriad of approaches in the
display cases, has repeatedly emphasized the importance of examining the
context of the display at issue to determine whether it has the effect of endorsing
religion.").
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Circuit held that the City's addition of the secular figures to the
display did not sufficiently dilute the scene's religious nature. 19
The Schundler decision illustrates a lower court's eagerness for
clear rules and longing for clarity in holiday display case law. In
its effort to replace the subjective, fact sensitive nature of display
jurisprudence, the Third Circuit attempted to create a rule for
public holiday displayslW Consequently, the court relied upon
Lynch,'2' Allegheny County,1' and Capitol Square'23 to arrive at
"generalized rules" from the "fact-specific precedents." '24
Commentator Laura Aim suggested that the working definition
of "context" is at the crux of the pedagogic difference between
Allegheny County and Schundler.'28 She noted that the Third
Circuit strictly narrowed the display's relevant context by
excluding the year-round celebrations from the symbols' relevant
context and by holding that the plastic secular figures were merely
tokens, not focal points of the scene." Ahn indicated that the
Schundler court dispensed with Justice Blackmun's philosophy
that the meaning behind a symbol can be determined by its overall
context and proclaimed that symbols have innate meanings.' 27
According to Ahn, the creche's innate meaning is religious and this
religious significance and cannot be altered.' 28
19 Id. at 1452.
0 Laura Alm, This Is Not A Creche, 107 YALE L.J. 1969, 1971-72 (1998).
121 See supra notes 27-46 and accompanying text.
122See supra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
124 Alm, supra note 120, at 1971. Aim commented, "For example, after
observing that the Allegheny Court found a privately owned creche on the
staircase of the county courthouse to constitute a violation of the Establishment
Clause, the Third Circuit determined that the government may not place a creche
on government property." Id. (citing ACLU v. Shundler, 104 F.3d. at 1435 (3d
Cir. 1997)).
"
5 Alm, supra note 120, at 1971.
'
26 Id. (citing, Schundler, 104 F.3d at 1435).
27 Id. See supra notes 56, 118-19 and accompanying text.
128 Id. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also generally, Calvin
R. Massey, Pure Symbols and The First Amendment, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
369.
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The Third Circuit's disdain for applying the Lynch and
Allegheny County fact sensitive approach to holiday displays is
apparent in the Schundler decision.2' A religious symbol is
simply religious. This was the court's way of taking a first stride
towards a bright-line law. Yet, not all the circuit courts are in
agreement with the Third Circuit. The Second Circuit, for instance,
takes the entirely opposite route and interprets "context" extremely
liberally.130
B. Elewiski v. City of Syracuse
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to decide
the constitutionality of a public religious display located in the city
of Syracuse, New York ("City").3  During the holiday season the
City bedecks its downtown area with holiday decorations. For
about eighty-five years the City displayed a government-owned
creche in a downtown public park called Clinton Square. 32 In
1995, statues of Jesus, Mary, a shepherd, a donkey, a lamb, and an
angel grasping a banner containing the words "Gloria in Exclesis
Deo," or "Glory to God in the Highest," were a part of the creche
exhibit. 33 In addition, an adorned Christmas tree was situated
behind the creche. 34 In affirming a decision of the district court,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the exhibit was
constitutional. 3 1
The court framed the issue as whether a reasonable observer of
the scene in its specific context would perceive a message of
9See supra notes 89-128 and accompanying text.
1oElewisi v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1186 (1998).
13 1 1d
132 Id. at 55.
133 Id. at 52. The phrase "Glory to God in the Highest" comes from the Gospel
of Luke. Id. at 58 (Cabrenes, J., dissenting).
11 Id at 52. Barricades with the name of the City's mayor, Roy A. Bemardi,
and the name of a City department, Department of Public Works, encompassed
the creche and tree. Id.
135 Id. See also Elewiski v. City of Syracuse, No. 95-CV-1830, 1996 WL
31169, at6. (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1996).
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governmental religious endorsement. 136 Adopting Justice
O'Connor's definition of the "reasonable observer," the court
asserted that the reasonable observer is one who is aware of the
context and history of the community and forum in which the
religious display is situated.137 As a result, the court concluded that
the reasonable observer of the display in its particular context
would not perceive a message of government endorsement 38
According to the court, the creche was a part of the City's overall
secular holiday exhibit; in addition, this broad "context - like the
context of the creche in Lynch or that of the menorah in Allegheny
County - neutralize[d] the message of governmental
endorsement., 139  The fact that the City bedecked its downtown
with secular holiday decorations would lead a reasonable observer
to conclude that the City was merely acknowledging the secular
nature of the holiday season. The court also found the creche
constitutional under the Lemon test. 40
The Elewiski decision has ignited sharp criticism by at least one
commentator who described the decision as "egregious."41
Furthermore, Judge Cabranes in his dissent in Elewiski, asserted
that the City's creche was not a part of the larger downtown
exhibit; rather, the symbol was a "separate, clearly demarcated
exhibit," not religiously diluted by the other downtown
decorations.'42
Another commentator opined that the Second Circuit
"misapplied relevant case law."'14 3 Specifically, the commentator
36 Elewiski, 123 F.3d at 53.
131 Id. at 54 (quoting Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
131 Id at 53.
139 Id. at 54. See supra notes 29, 55 and accompanying text.
140 Id. (stating that the City's goal of promoting business downtown and
encouraging community unity satisfied the purpose prong of the test, the fizding
of no appearance of endorsement satisfied the second prong and the claimant did
not claim excessive entanglement.).
141 Burton Caine, "The Liberal Agenda ": Biblical Values and The First
Amendment, 14 ToURo L. REv. 129, 157 (1997).
142Elewiski, 123 F.3d at 58-59 (Cabranes, J., dissenting).
143 Recent Cases, supra note 86, at 2465. (stating that under the Supreme Court
decisions in Lynch, Allegheny County, Capitol Square, and "its own precedents,
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argued that the Second Circuit ignored the Allegheny County
decision which did not consider holiday decorations in other areas
of the County Courthouse to decide the creche standing alone was
unconstitutional.1" Furthermore, the commentator noted that the
Elewiski court misinterpreted the Allegheny County court's holding
and analysis as to the menorah. 5 In Allegheny County the
menorah was next to a Christmas tree which served as an
acknowledgment of Christmas and Hanukah as contemporaneous
holidays, whereas the City's scene in Elewiski acknowledged one
holiday, Christmas. 46 This commentator also suggested that unlike
the Allegheny County menorah and the Capitol Square cross, the
creche in Elewiski was publicly owned. 147 Moreover, the City's
creche was not erected on private property, unlike the creche in
Lynch. 14
The Elewiski decision illustrates a liberal interpretation of the
Supreme Court guidelines for religious displays, 49 whereas the
Schundler decision exemplifies a conservative approach." The
two lower court cases demonstrate the inconsistency and chaos in
the circuit courts when dealing with government religious scenes.
The Supreme Court has not formulated a solid method for deciding
the constitutionality of public religious displays.
I. REASONS FOR THE CONFUSION
The Supreme Court decisions involving public religious displays
are inconsistent and the current state of the law for deciding the
constitutionality of these scenes is in complete disarray.
Commentators are spellbound by the disparity that has resulted
from Lemon and its progeny.
the Court of Appeals should have examined only the creche display, not the rest
of downtown Syracuse, and should have found this free-standing exhibit
unconstitutional.").
11 Id at 2465-66 (quoting Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598).
145 Id. at 2467.
11 Id (citing, Allegheny County, 592 U.S. at 618).
147 Id at 2467 (citing Elewiski, 123 F.3d at 52).
148 Id. (citing Elewiski, 123 F.3d at 52).
149 See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
'o See supra notes 89-128 and accompanying text.
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A. The Two Schools of Thought
Two opposing doctrinal interpretations have developed from a
lack of agreement as to the meaning of the Establishment
Clause.15 1 The lack of consensus as to the proper interpretation of
the Clause is reflected in the Supreme Court's inharmonious
decisions of government-backed religious displays. 152  Two
primary schools of thought over the meaning of the Establishment
Clause have developed - separationists and accommodationists.'53
Separationists urge that the Establishment Clause requires a
strict division between government and religion. The doctrine
calling for strict separation derives from the Jeffersonian notion of
the "wall of separation between Church and State.' ' 154 As
documented support for their view, separationists cite to Thomas
Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists, in which Jefferson
declared that the Establishment Clause erected a "wall between
Church and State.' 55  Separationists interpret the Establishment
1'' See infra notes 154-166 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 16-75 and accompanying text.
15' Raymond Mitchell, A Small Departure From The Truth: When Private
Religious Speech Runs Afoul Of The Establishment Clause, 23 LoY. U. CI. L.J.
867, 869 (1992 ) (citing Donald L. Drakerman, Church-State Constitutional
Issues 97-106 (1991); John White, The Theology And Politics of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489, 491
(1991)).
'" Shanin Rezai, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos In
Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 503, 507 (1990) (citing 16
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904)
(declaring that religious matters belong solely "between man and God.")).
... Mitchell, supra note 153, at 869 (noting that Thomas Jefferson wrote the
following:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or
his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach action
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that
the act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall
of separation between Church and State ... I reciprocate your kind
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Clause as requiring a broad wall between government and religion.
In other words, they advocate the prohibition of the government's
preference of religion over nonreligion, not only the prohibition of
government preference of one religion over another.-6
In contrast, accommodationists contend that the Establishment
Clause mainly prohibits the establishment of a national religion or
church. In referring to such examples as legislative prayer,
Thanksgiving Day, and Sunday closing laws, accommodationists
urge that the Establishment Clause was not meant to "'forbid
neutral government support for religion as a whole.""'1 "
Applying both schools of thought inconsistently, the Supreme
Court has been unable to arrive at a clear framework for the
analysis of government displays of religious symbols." 8 For
example, the Everson opinion, which is frequently cited by courts
deciding the constitutionality of government religious displays,
illustrates the Court's adoption of the separationist viewpoint.5 9 In
retrospect, the Everson court proclaimed that the Establishment
Clause has erected a lofty wall between Church and State)w°
However, as one commentator indicated, by concluding that the
reimbursement program to parochial school students was
constitutional, the Everson court did not adhere to the fundamental
principles of strict neutrality. 16 ' For instance, the Court asserted
prayers for the protection and blessing of the common Father and
Creator of man.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and
Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the state
of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in JOHN T. NOONAN, THE BEItEVER
AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 130-31 (1987)).
' Dawn Brewer, Constitutional Law: Religious Symbols On Government
Property: Wfhere Do We Stand?, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 375, 378 (1990).
157 Id. (quoting Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down The Barrier to
Religious displays, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 185, 202 (1985)). Brewer noted that
"an accommodationist might not find unconstitutional a tax exemption for all
religious organizations, but a separationist might view the exemption as an
unconstitutional preference for religious groups over nonreligious groups and
thus unconstitutional." Id.
158 See supra notes 16-85 and accompanying text.
'
9 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
160 Id.
161 Rezai, supra note 154, at 510.
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that the Establishment Clause does not require the government to
be an antagonist of religion. 62 Notwithstanding the Everson
court's proclamation that a broad wall divides Church and State, it
simultaneously authorized financial subsidies to parochial
schools.163
Similarly, the tripartite test that was developed by the Lemon
Court originally warranted a strict division between Church and
State as well. 1' Nevertheless, the Lemon test's separationist
framework became transformed into a vehicle for more
accommodationist outcomes. 65 As one commentator noted, while
a strict separationist test seemed to provide the courts with an
unambiguous standard for Establishment Clause issues, the
doctrine's rigidity yielded inconsistent outcomes. Courts began to
apply the Lemon test in a more flexible manner" which caused the
test to be a source of unpredictability, especially for government
religious display jurisprudence.
B. The Lemon Test and Its Modifcations
When the Supreme Court created the Lemon test, 67 its intention
was to elucidate Establishment Clause jurisprudence by furnishing
a uniform vehicle of analysis. 68 However, the Lemon test has been
unable to propagate predictable results from the day of its
creation. 69 The outcome of the test's application depends upon the
'
62 Id. (citing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
'
63 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
165 Rezai, supra note 154, at 511 (footnotes omitted).
'66See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.67 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
'6' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
169 Freeman, supra note 16, at 621. The commentator remarked that Justice
Rebnquist
best described these inconsistencies by noting, for example, a State
may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that
contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of
the United States for use in a geography class. A State may lend
textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on
George Washington, or a film projector in a history class. A State
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doctrinal structure within which a court chooses to apply it. In fact,
one critic remarked that accommodationists "have manipulated, or
even ignored, the Lemon standard in order to impose a different
doctrinal viewpoint."'17
1. Lynch's manipulation of the Lemon test
The Lynch decision is a primary example of the Court's loose
application of the Lemon test. 71 By asserting that the analysis of
the government holiday display must be measured against the
overall context of the government action, the Court eradicated the
test's effectiveness in religious display cases.'2 In adding the
aspect of observing the display against the context of the winter
holiday season, the Court effectively manipulated the purpose and
effect prongs of the Lemon test.173 The Court did not analyze the
government action by itself; instead, it combined the action with
additional practices to guarantee a holding of constitutionality.
Furthermore, by incorporating a historical continuum aspect into
the effect prong of the test, the Court was able to conclude that the
effect of the creche was no more harmful than past government aid
to religion that was upheld in the past.'74 The Lynch decision
marked the Supreme Court's trasformation of what was a strict
separationist approach into an accommodationist approach toward
Establishment Clause issues.
The Lynch court's twisting of the Lemon test was a result of the
Court's frustration with the inflexible nature of the test in its true
form. The first prong of the Lemon test is easy to satisfy. The
may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend workbooks in
which the parochial school children write, thus rendering them
nonresusable. A State may pay for bus transportation from the
parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a
field trip.
Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted)).
"
7 Rezai, supra note 154, at 505 (footnotes omitted).
7 See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
173 Id
4 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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legislature simply must announce a secular purpose for the
display.75 The second prong of the test, however, is theoretically
more problematic to apply.176 As one commentator indicated, the
Establishment Clause cases always deal with a state act which
affects religious activities or institutions; therefore, if stringently
applied, the effect prong would find most of these actions
offensive. 177 Accordingly, the Supreme Court abandoned a strict
application of the Lemon test which in turn yielded inconsistent
and unpredictable results.1
78
As one commentator suggested, the Lynch Court's
accommodationist method of analyzing a public religious display
provided a stimulus for courts to create their own versions of what
constitutes a permissible religious display. 79 Lynch's expansive
holdings, broad language in its application of the Lemon test, and
utilization of subjective standards paved the way for the havoc and
confusion that haunt public religious display jurisprudence.8SO
In failing to comment on other types of religious displays, courts
were left with limited guidance. For example, the Lynch Court did
not comment on a cross or menorah standing alone. As a result,
courts have had to develop tests suitable for specific displays at
issue, as exemplified in the Allegheny County opinion.'8'
2. The endorsement analysis - any help?
Justice O'Connor proclaimed that the crucial matter involves a
person's right not to feel politically alienated in our religiously
diverse community.'82 Few commentators are convinced that
Justice O'Connor's viewpoint is the solution to the problems
'7' Rezai, supra note 154, at 518 (footnotes omitted).
I76 d. (footnotes omitted).
" Id.(footnotes omitted).
178 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
171 Brewer, note 156, at 381 (stating "Lynch provided an impetus for courts to
construe and define their own versions of constitutional displays.").
180 Brewer, note 156, at 381-82 (footnotes omitted); see also supra notes 36-39
and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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involving the jurisprudence of public religious displays."' One
commentator praised the Justice's alternative analysis and asserted
that she appropriately acknowledged that in some instances a
government action may support religion "without endorsing it. '
Most commentators on this area, however, have expressed
dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the endorsement test when
determining the constitutionality of government-backed religious
displays. 18
Commentator Dawn Brewer, noted that the Allegheny County
court's use of the endorsement test does little to remedy Lynch 's
deficiencies.186 She suggested that while an endorsement analysis
renders several factors significant when considering government-
backed religious displays, no concrete guidance really exists.18
7
Similar to the Lynch analysis, the endorsement test used by the
Allegheny County court is very fact-sensitive.18 In fact, Brewer
suggested that the Allegheny County decision "may have created a
'reindeer rule"'189 by focusing on the characteristics of holiday
decorations to determine the constitutionality of a display."9°
1"3 See, e.g., E. Gregory Wallace, Mhen The Government Speaks Religiously,
21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1183, 1218 (1994) (calling Justice O'Connor's
alternative "a welcome refinement of the Lemon test.").
184 Id Wallace quoted Justice O'Connor: "Focusing on the evil of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion makes clear that the effect prong of the
Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require invalidation of a government
practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement
or inhibition of religion." Id. n. 177 (quoting Lynch i. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see generally Williams, supra note
86 (discussing the benefits of the endorsement analysis when deciding the
constitutionality of public religious displays).
"I5 See infra notes 186-206 and accompanying text.
186 Brewer, supra note 156 at 388 (noting "this 'refinement' offers no more a
measure of permissibility than did the Lynch decision.").7 Id (footnotes omitted).
188 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
189 Brewer, supra note 156 at 387.
90 See supra notes 54, 56 and accompanying text; Brewer, supra note 156 at
387 (noting that "the menorah's splintered opinions indicate that the Court is
actually undecided as to the proper context in which to evaluate religious
displays."). Brewer also blamed the opinion's flaws in part on the plurality's
split as to doctrinal beliefs. Id. at 388. Therefore, the opinion reflects both
separationist and accommodationist viewpoints. Id. Brewer noted that
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As illustrated by the Schundler opinion, this emphasis on the
specific factual situations surrounding holiday displays has
frustrated the efforts of courts in the quest for a clear rule of law. 9'
Moreover, commentator Calvin Massey proposed another
potentially serious flaw in the endorsement analysis - overlooking
the government's purpose of a display.192 Massey described a
hypothetical city exhibit of "a creche, a menorah, an image of
Buddha, a copy of the Koran, and a sign exhorting atheism."' 93 He
asked, "Aside from the effect on the observer of this exhibit, what
is the purpose of the government's choice of this compilation of
symbols?"1'  "Was it to ridicule religion or express neutrality
about any particular religion?"1 95 Furthermore, Massey indicated
that a government may genuinely have intended to express
neutrality, but the message to observers may be one of hostility.'
19 6
In addition, the endorsement analysis formulates the notion of
establishment as a role of personal sentiments and perceptions
rather than an abuse of government authority.'97 Therefore, the test
calls for the inference that "felt disabilities" are "real
disabilities."' 98 This inference is a far-fetched assumption.
Allegheny County's creche plurality consists of three judges, separationist in
stance: Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan; while, the menorah plurality consists of
four judges accommodationist in stance: Kennedy, White, Scalia, and
Rehnquist. Id. n. 120.
191 See supra notes 97-119 and accompanying text; Aln, supra note 120 at
1974 (stating "[a]s subsequent cases continue to develop the full meaning of the
Allegheny principle, proponents of clear rules may find their best efforts
frustrated by the sheer variety of factual situations in holiday display cases.").
'92 Massey, supra note 128, at 379-80 (1990) (stating "It is unfortunate that the
Court chose to focus solely on the effect prong of Lemon, since employment of
pure symbols, especially when diluted by association with other pure symbols,
raises troublesome questions about the purpose of such display.").
'
93 Id. at 380.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
17 Wallace, supra note 183, at 1221 (noting "the purpose of the endorsement
inquiry is to protect the sensibilities of nonadherents.").
198 Id. at 1222 (asserting that "[w]hen the government speaks religiously, 'no
one loses the right to vote, the freedom to speak, or any other state or federal
right."') (footnotes omitted).
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Moreover, which sentiments and perceptions should courts use
when deciding if a display is offensive to Establishment Clause
principles?1 9 Justice O'Connor's reasonable observer "assumes
that there is a single impartial perspective from which to judge
whether government has 'endorsed religion."' As commentators
have asserted, however, there is no one unbiased perception from
which to determine whether a government action has the effect of
religious endorsement." l
Whether a court adopts the view of Justice O'Connor' or the
definition of Justice Stevens' reasonable observerun there is still a
question as to the religious attributes of the reasonable observer. Is
the observer a religious outsider or devoutly faithful? What
religion does the observer practice? A commentator suggested that
the objective observer is really the judge?04 Accordingly, since a
judge often carries the beliefs of the majority culture, the observer
standard is almost never from the outsider's point of view.20 The
endorsement test, however, is aimed at protecting outsiders from
feeling alienated from the political community.' Consequently, a
primary aspect of the endorsement test is inherently flawed.
In sum, the endorsement test calls for a court's analysis of which
combination of religious symbols and secular symbols have
199 Id. at 1220 (footnotes omitted).
2W Id
201 Freeman, supra note 16, at 624 (stating "If the court desires a finding of
constitutionality, the court may use an informed observer who is familiar with
the community's history, politics, and setting. However, if the court desires a
finding of unconstitutionality, it may utilize a simple passerby who
'hypothetically has just stepped off the bus when he or she observes the
display.") (quoting Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment
Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 479); Wallace, supra note 183, at 1221
(stating "In the end, of course, most would agree that it is the judge's own
perception that counts."). See, e.g., supra notes 112-13 and accompanying
text; But see also, supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 137-38 and
accompanying text.
203 See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also notes 112-13 and
accompanying text
Wallace, supra, note 183 at 1221.
205 Wallace, supra, note 183 1220-21 (footnotes omitted).
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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appropriate effects under the Establishment Clause. Such an
approach does not provide a solid rule of law. By the time the
Supreme Court decided Capitol Square, it was obvious that a more
consistent standard for public displays was necessary.
3. Capitol Square s "per se" rule
In an effort to uproot the tedious case-by-case evaluation of
privately owned holiday displays on public property, the Supreme
Court in Capitol Square endeavored to create a per se rule only
with respect to privately sponsored religious displays in public
fora °7'2 The Court dispensed with the Lemon and endorsement
tests. 08
The per se rule, that a privately sponsored display erected in a
traditionally public forum is constitutional,20° may do away with
litigation and provide a more consistent framework for courts
dealing with privately owned holiday displays. Nevertheless, at
least one commentator has noted that this rule also has
shortcomings.210 Commentator Kathryn Williams indicated that a
viewer of such a display may believe the exhibit is somehow
related to the owner of the property on which it stands.2 '
Specifically, she asserted that the plurality failed to acknowledge
that a viewer of the cross against the backdrop of the Statehouse
could reasonably perceive government sponsorship of the religious
symbol. This commentator opined that the Capitol Square per
se analysis "is an oversimplification of the endorsement test. 2 13
C. Religious Symbols, History, and The Season
' See supra note 74 and accompanying text. A commentator remarked that
the Capitol Square plurality created a bright line rule to allow for quick dispute
resolution, thereby discouraging litigation. Williams, supra note 86 at 1612.
' See supra note 74 and accompanying text
w Id.210 Williams, supra note 86 at 1640.
211 id.
212 1d. at 1638.
213 id.
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The Lemon test and the endorsement analysis for religious
displays have yielded inconsistent conclusions based on subjective
interpretations. In addition to the conflict between the
accommodationists and separationists, it has been proposed that
the chaotic nature of holiday display jurisprudence particularly as
it relates to holiday displays, may be due to the nature of the winter
season, the symbols, and the holiday scenes themselves." 4 For
example, commentator Gregory Blackburn explained that the
secular nature of the holiday season and its symbols has
intertwined with their sectarian meanings 1 5 A menorah, for
instance, is both an important religious symbol and a reference to a
historical event.2
16
Accordingly, it has been suggested this dual nature of holiday
symbols has been the impetus for the tedious case-by-case analysis
employed by the Supreme Court.2?17 The Court's failure to create a
consistent test for deciding whether a symbol is solely religious or
whether one has secular meaning as well may be a significant
reason for the difficulty encountered in holiday display cases.2
18
The Court has not necessarily addressed the issue of the dual
nature of holiday symbols. 219 As a result, we are left with a
214 See generally, Gregory J. Blackburn, Government, The Holiday Season, And
The Establishment Clause: A Perspective On The Issues, 20 STETSON L. REV.
217 (1990) (discussing the seminal Supreme Court decisions dealing with public
religious displays and the problems with the current guidelines); see also Joshua
Zarrow, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment Clause And Publicly
Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 ArM. U. L. REV. 477 (1986)
(discussing the flaws in the Lynch analysis).
25 Blackburn, supra note 214 at 217-18. Blackburn asserted that over time
"the secular aspects of the holiday seasons and symbols have commingled with
the religious aspects, so that the seasons and symbols have become equivocal in
their true meaning and purpose." Id.
216 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
217 Blackburn, supra note 214 at 218. Blackburn suggested that "the many
symbols associated with the holiday season incorporate at once varying degrees
of historical, religious, and popular significance. The pervasive ambiguity of
these symbols significantly affects substantive establishment clause analysis and
has caused the Supreme Court to use a distinct case-by-case approach in
deciding holiday displays." Id. (footnotes omitted).
218 Id, at 240.
2 9 Id. (noting that the Supreme Court "has not yet comprehensively examined
the duality issue, but must do so before an appropriate standard can be
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colossal number of confused lower courts left to decide if a candy
cane or a poinsettia has enough secular meaning to dilute the
religious component of a creche.
Moreover, as exemplified by the Supreme Court decisions in
Schundler and Elewiski, the Court has neglected to delineate the
boundaries of the "context" in which symbols are to be
evaluated. 2°0 Should the relevant context of the symbols be the
seasonal backdrop22' or the context of the isolated display? m  With
this question unanswered, a court has the ability to come to the
conclusion that suits its fancy. If a court is separationist in its
thinking, it will naturally characterize relevant context as a
display's immediate surroundings.2 On the other hand, if a court
is accommodationist in nature, it will define the relevant context in
a broader manner224
Public religious display cases are also plagued with what one
commentator characterized as the Court's discriminating and
sporadic use of historical arguments to reinforce its interpretation
of the Establishment Clause.?2 He commented that the Court must
delineate a more concrete historiography. 6 As the next section of
this discussion will illustrate, the history of the Establishment
Clause is concrete and that history mandates that the Court
immediately reevaluate the current state of public religious display
jurisprudence. ' 7
articulated."); Zarrow, supra note 214 at 507 (stating the Lynch historical
continuum approach "does not account for the dual nature, and dual effects, of
religious symbols.").
2 See supra notes 118, 136-39 and accompanying text.
-' See supra notes 36, 118 and accompanying text.
2See supra notes 54-56, 136-39 and accompanying text.
m See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
"
4 See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
2 John Witte, Jr., The Theology And Politics of The First Amendment Religion
Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMoRY L.J. 489, 506 (noting that the
Supreme Court's "habit of selectively and sporadically invoking historical
arguments to bolster its interpretation of the religion clauses has distorted the
historical data and diluted the Court's arguments.").
M Id.
n7 See infra notes 228-282 and accompanying text.
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IV. PROPOSAL
This author agrees firmly with the commentators who hold in
disdain the Court's methods for dealing with public religious
displays. The Supreme Court's guidelines for determining the
constitutionality of public religious displays are completely flawed.
The Lemon, test as reformulated by the Lynch court, and the
endorsement test' both leave too much wiggle-room for courts to
make subjective and intellectually dishonest opinions. The unclear
definitions of the "reasonable observer," "context," and "religious
symbol" are confusing for lower courts and yield inconsistent
opinions. Yet, most commentators have not discussed the primary
cause of the preposterous state of the law for government religious
displays. This is where most commentators and I part company.
I propose that the problem is right in front of our eyes; and the
solution lies right in the text of the Establishment Clause itself."
Our nation's founders incorporated a law into our Bill of Rights
that prohibits the government from creating any law "respecting an
establishment of religion."'  The Establishment Clause does not
forbid the neutral advancement of religion; nor does the Clause
prohibit incidental benefits to religion.2' Neutral government
activities, like displays that recognize the festive sentiments of the
winter holiday season, are not establishments of religion.
If our founders intended to prohibit neutral religious activities
that only incidentally implicate religion, they would have
incorporated such language into the text of the constitution. In
fact, James Madison, the primary designer of the Clause's
structure, made it a point to reassure skeptical parties to a Senate
debate by asserting the Clause meant that "Congress should not
establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by
law."232 Furthermore, during the Senate debates, Madison declared
that Congress could not "compel men to worship."2-3 Madison
z See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
M Id.
231 Id
232 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 730, 758 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
233 Id( at 730.
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further made the Clause's purpose clear when he contended that
"he believed that the people feared one sect might obtain
preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to
which they would compel others to conform.' ' 234 It does not seem
that James Madison, the principal author of the First Amendment,
intended the Establishment Clause to mean that a city courthouse
cannot decorate its steps or front lawn with holiday decorations
that are a part of our nation's culture. Madison referred to a
prohibition on governmental preference for one religious sect over
others, not a preference for irreligion in general.
In addition to Madison's declarations, perhaps even more
significant, are two decisions from our nation's Supreme Court:
Zorach v. Causon235 and Marsh v. Chambers. 6  The Zorach
decision involves a "release time" program for the religious
teaching of children attending public school.Y37 In its analysis the
Zorach court proclaimed that the First Amendment does not
require a separation of Church and State in every respect. 2 8
The Zorach court established that if there were to be a complete
separation of Church and State, "the state and religion would be
aliens to each other, hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly." ' 9
Indeed, deeming a holiday scene containing a creche with some
festive poinsettias as unlawful sends a message of hostility toward
religion in general. 2'" Subjecting holiday displays to demeaning
analysis, like that of comparing the secular meaning of an
evergreen tree to the message of the creche or menorah, or
2
m Id. at 731.
231343 U.S. 306 (1952).
236 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
237 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308. The case involved a New York City program that
permitted its public schools to release students during school hours so they could
leave the school premises to attend religious centers for religious instruction. Id.
On written request from parents, students were released from school. Id. The
Court found the program constitutional under the Establishment Clause. Id. at
312.
" Id. at 312 (stating that the First Amendment "within the scope of its
coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First
Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a
separation of Church and State.").
239 id.
240 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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analyzing the secular meaning of greenery, is degrading to
religious people in general. 41 As commentator Philip Kurland
rightfully noted, there is no evidence showing the founders'
concern for freedom of irreligion.242
This point was also recognized by the Zorach Court.243 In
deciding the constitutionality of the release time program, the
Court declared that "[W]e are a religious people whose institutions
presupposes a Supreme Being."2 "' The Zorach Court supported its
proposition by citing such practices as prayers in the legislature,
appeals to God in messages from the President, the presidential
proclamations deeming Thanksgiving as a national holiday, and
the language "So help me God" in the country's courtroom
oaths.245 The Court further asserted that if these practices were
deemed as being offensive to the First Amendment, the
government would be expressing a "callous indifference" to
religious sects.24 We would be undermining the sacred meanings
of some of our nation's oldest rituals and traditional practice.4 7
The Zorach Court clearly delineated what constitutes an
Establishment Clause violation: (1) the government may not
impose any sect on a person and (2) the government cannot force
anyone to attend a church, recognize a religious holiday, or
participate in religious instruction." Moreover, the Supreme
Court declared "[W]e cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a
philosophy of hostility to religion." 4 9 The Zorach Court did not
consider neutral activities with incidental religious effects as
241 See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
242 Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of The Religion Clauses of The Constitution,
27 WiM. & MARY L. Rav. 839, 855 (1985/1986). Kurland stated, "Quite to the
contrary, they sought to protect man's relation to his god... am hard put to find
any evidence in the development of legal protection for religious freedom that
indicates any attention to protect atheists." Id.
243 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
244 Id
245 Id at 312-13.
246 Id at 314.
247 I The Zorach court asserted "we find no constitutional requirement which
makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion." Id.
248 Id
249 Ida at 315.
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unconstitutional.25 0 Rather the Court interpreted the Establishment
Clause as mandating a flexible wall between Church and State.26
Like Zorach, the Marsh decision, which deals with legislative
prayer before Nebraska legislative sessions, reaffirmed the idea
that the Establishment Clause was not intended to mandate the
government favoritism of irreligion over religion. 52 The Court
held that legislative prayer is not an Establishment Clause
violation. 3 The Court described the practice of legislative prayer
as "part of the fabric of our society." 4  Therefore, legislative
prayer is only a permissible recognition of beliefs expansively
possessed by the nation's people.25
The Marsh court specifically indicated that from the colonial
period through the creation of the nation, and since then, legislative
prayer has existed simultaneously with the ideals of
disestablishment. 56 For instance, the Court indicated that three
days after Congress approved the designation of paid legislative
chaplains,257 the final text of the Bill of Rights was agreed upon. 28
The drafters of the Establishment Clause did not consider
legislative prayer as offensive to the Establishment Clause. 9
250 Id.
251 id.
252 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983). The litigation involved
chaplains paid by the state of Nebraska to lead prayers at the beginning of each
legislative session. Id.
" Id. at 792. "To invoke divine guidance on a public body entrusted with
making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 'establishment of religion."'
Id.
2 Id. "In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with
prayer has become part of the fabric of our society." Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 757.
257 Id. at 758.
258 Id. (footnotes omitted).
2 Id. "Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clause did
not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that
Amendment." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Just as legislative prayer is considered part of "the fabric of our
society," '  the annual appearance of winter holiday scenes
throughout the country is deeply rooted in our nation's history and
tradition. Just like legislative prayer, a government-backed
religious display is "a permissible recognition of beliefs
expansively possessed by the nation's people."26
The Zorach and Marsh decisions are clearly relevant to public
religious display jurisprudence.O' The Zorach court strongly
advised that the Establishment clause was not intended to foster
"callous indifference" to religion.2 Likewise, the Court reiterated
that we cannot enforce the Establishment Clause to the point that
we would undermine the value of our nation's oldest traditions.'
Public holiday displays containing religious symbols are like
legislative prayers, the practice of reciting "So help me God" in the
courtroom oath, and the government's recognition of Thanksgiving
as a national holiday. These instances all have meaning beyond
religion. Like the examples cited by the Zorach court, public
religious displays in recognition of the holiday season are normal
aspects of society; they remind us of tradition, democracy,
accomplishment, and hope. As the Zorach Court suggests, to
remove a traditional aspect from our culture because it has
incidental religious connotations, would alienate religious
institutions from the government to a dangerous extent.m
The Supreme Court, in the Zorach decision, established what
constitutes an Establishment Clause violation.24 Public displays of
winter holiday symbols do not constitute direct imposition of a sect
on a person, nor do they force anyone to attend a church, recognize
a religious holiday, or participate in religious instruction 7 If
anyone does feel forced to follow a religious practice because of a
'59 See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 235-60 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
5 See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
267 id
"
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scene recognizing the festive cheer and historical significance of
the holiday season, the reason derives from that person's own
insecurities, not government coercion.
As for the Marsh decision, the Court not only noted instances
which evidence the framers' intent for a low wall between Church
and State,268 the Court also asserted that the content of legislative
prayer is not the concern of judges where there is no evidence that
the prayer has been used to proselytize or advance a belief.269 The
Court concluded that legislative prayer is not a proselytizing
device.27° A holiday display with religious symbols can be
compared to the legislative prayer in Marsh because the
expression's content contains references to religion, but the
expression is not intended to be a proselytizing device. Rather, a
legislative prayer and a public holiday display recognize the
inspirational and historical traditions of society. Moreover, the
Marsh court asserted that since the legislative prayer does not
evidence intent to proselytize or advance religion (it advances
history and tradition), it is "not for us to embark on a sensitive
evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer.
'271
This author is disheartened that the Supreme Court neglected the
precedent of Zorach and Marsh. The Court's insistence on
applying the modified Lemon test to government holiday displays
violates Supreme Court precedent and our founders' intent.
Justice Kennedy's coercion test comes closest to what Zorach,
Marsh, and the nation's founders require.72 Justice Kennedy wrote
that applying an endorsement analysis to holiday displays exudes
an unfounded belligerence towards religion.2 " Moreover,
Kennedy's views that a religiously neutral State requires that the
government not coerce one to believe in or exercise any religion
and that the government cannot directly benefit any religion in a
manner that would establish a State Church, are directly in sync
268 See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
269 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 798 (1983).
270 id.
271 id.
272 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
273 Id.
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with the proper interpretation of the Establishment Clause.'
Justice Kennedy is correct in that a constitutional standard that
uses "coercion" as the main focal point best promotes the existence
of a neutral state. The Lemon test and its endorsement alternative
reflects the Court's ignorance of its own precedents.'7 5
This author finds it abhorrent that a court deemed a City's
display of a menorah, a creche, a Christmas tree, Santa, and Frosty
the Snowman as unlawful,276 but found a cross standing alone in a
public park lawful under the Establishment Clause.2n
How could a neutral recognition of a nation's cultural tradition
be unconstitutional but a cross erected in a public park by the KKK
be held lawful? The answer is that the wrong test has been
formulated for determining the constitutionality of religious
displays. In ignoring Supreme Court precedent zs the statements
by our founders279 and the secular nature of certain religious
symbols,m the Court refused to abandon the Lemon test when
deciding the constitutionality of public holiday displays.
The Supreme Court and the nation's founders have proclaimed
that the Establishment Clause prevents the government from
coercing or forcing one to believe in a particular faith.2s t In
defiance of the established meaning of the Establishment Clause,
the courts, in dealing with holiday displays, continue to cite the
strict separationist language from Everson and Lemon. As a result
of the Supreme Court's defiance of the announced neutral policy of
the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test, which is a strict
separationist framework, was deemed the standard for weighing
the constitutionality of all government actions relating to
religion.' Consequently, the Court applied the strict separationist
framework and its modifications to neutral government actions
274See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
275See supra notes 245-47, 260, 268 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
277See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
27See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
279See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text..
See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
2s See supra notes 232-34, 248 and accompanying text.
z See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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with incidental religious connotations, like holiday displays. In
turn, this led to the tedious case-by-case grinding, ambiguous rules,
and superficial distinctions to circumvent the strict separationist
mandates of Everson and Lemon.
The Supreme Court must redeem the sad state of holiday display
jurisprudence and recognize that the Establishment Clause was
only meant to prohibit a State Church. An adoption of Justice
Kennedy's test would be a welcomed change. Even this standard,
however, has room for improvement. For instance, the Court
would need to define exactly "coercion."
My proposal for a more intellectually honest, consistent, and fair
standard for courts to utilize when analyzing government religious
displays is more in sync with the intended meaning of the
Establishment Clause. First, it must be asked if the type of display
has cultural and historical meaning beyond religion. If the display
is understood to be of the type that recognizes a national tradition
at the "fabric of our society," the scene is constitutional per se. If
the display contains symbols that have only pure and blatantly
religious meaning, it must be decided if the meaning is so strong
that it has a coercive impact.
Creches and menorahs have two meanings, secular and religious.
When the government chooses to display these symbols, it is
acknowledging a secular tradition that is embedded in our culture -
similar to legislative prayer. The government is not mandating the
following of the Judeo-Christian practices. My proposal is to
reinstate what our founders, precedent, and the Bill of Rights
mandate - a nation that is neutral toward religion and not hostile
toward religious traditions that have secular meaning.
CONCLUSION
My proposal for improving religious display guidelines primarily
involves the idea that some symbols and some forms of expression
have two meanings. Symbols displayed during the winter holiday
season have secular and religious significance. Their secular
meanings have taken on possibly even more importance than their
religious meanings.
Consider once again a display that is located in the front courtyard
of a County Hall of Records building in the state of New Jersey.
1092 [Vol 15
40
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 3, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss3/10
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
The scene consists of a rendition of the Christian nativity, a
menorah, and a Christmas tree. Every winter I pass this display
and see children from diverse backgrounds stare at the winter
scene. The young observers and their parents are smiling. They
smile because the scene reminds them of our nation's heritage, the
joy of giving, and the value of forgiveness. The display does not
proselytize the observers. The display reminds them that another
winter in this great nation has arrived. James Madison and our
founders did not intend for the Establishment Clause to eradicate
such joyous moments. Rather, our founders intended to preserve
annual rituals to remind us of nation's progress and heritage.
The observers of the New Jersey holiday display reminds me of a
group of curious viewers I once saw at the National Gallery in
Washington D.C. The artistic beauty and religious portrayals of
Renaissance artists particularly fascinated these observers. When I
think about the Courts' practice of dissecting the content of holiday
displays to decide their lawfulness, I become frightened. Is the
Court next going to dissect the contents of religious paintings in
government museums to decide if they constitute impermissible
religious endorsement? How far will the Court go in distorting the
original intent of our founders?
The Marsh Court quotes Justice Goldberg who said, "the
measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness
to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow." In its
jurisprudence of government holiday displays, the Court has
falsely characterized a "mere shadow" (public holiday displays) as
a "real threat."
Jennifer H. Greenhalgh *
' Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794 (quoting Abington, 347 U.S. at 308 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
* This Comment is dedicated to the memory of my late grandfather, Murray
Greenhalgh. With special thanks to: Professor Gary Shaw, Esther Schonfeld
and Erin Sidaras.
1999 1093
41
Greenhalgh: Establishment Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999
1094 TOUROLAWREVIEW [Vol 15
42
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 3, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss3/10
